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This paper explores entrepreneurship in biotech through the in depth analysis of four new 
ventures located in the Upper-Rhine Biovalley. One of the strengths of this paper is the presence 
of both successful cases of entrepreneurship and of cases of failures. This gives the opportunity to 
discuss the role of several factors on the performance of a new biotech venture. Three points 
particularly comes out of this study: The importance of public science, without which new 
biotech firms could hardly exist; the role of the patent system, the importance of which we link to 
the business model adopted by the firm; and the importance of collaborations, which we study 
through the concept of distributed entrepreneurship. 
 
Keywords: Intellectual property rights, patents, science, distributed entrepreneurship, collective 
invention 





This paper was written in the framework of the Keins (Knowledge Based Entrepreneurship: 
Innovation Networks and Systems) project, which aims at “examining the relevance, features and 
developments of knowledge based entrepreneurship in Europe”
1. This project is organised in two 
phases: In a first one, early case studies are conducted in order to identify preliminary 
hypotheses, which can then be tested in more depth in the second phase by using quantitative 
studies. This paper is part of the early case studies. 
 
We describe and analyse the specific case of four start-ups
2 located in the Alsatian side of the 
Upper-Rhine Biovalley. For each firm we gathered in depth information about the genesis of the 
                                                 
♦ BETA, CNRS-UMR 7522, Université Louis Pasteur Strasbourg I, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67085 Strasbourg 
Cedex, France. Corresponding author's e-mail: penin@cournot.u-strasbg.fr
This paper was prepared for the Keins project and presented at the Keins meeting held in Göteborg, May the 29-30, 
2006. The authors gratefully acknowledge Camilla Lenzi and Franco Malerba for helpful comments. Usual 
disclaimers apply. 
This work is also part of another project, specifically dedicated to DNA vaccine, called MIDEV and financed by the 
CNRS – INSERM - MiRe – DREES in the frame of the program “Sciences biomédicales, santé et société”. 
1 The Keins project specifically aims at departing from the traditional approach of entrepreneur as an individual and 
isolated hero (the Schumpeterian mark I view, 1911) in order to focus on the importance of networks and institutions 
(such as universities and public research organizations) in the entrepreneurship process. 
2 One of the four firms we analyse is not really a firm in the sense that the project of creation of a venture aborted 
before the firm was founded. 
  1firm, its history and the characteristics of the founders. Based on those four cases we aim at 
identifying variables that might help to understand entrepreneurship in biotech. 
 
The field of biotechnology is appropriate to study knowledge based entrepreneurship since during 
the last two decades there has been an upsurge of new firms, “growing in the world from nothing 
in the mid seventies to several thousands nowadays” (Zucker et al., 1998; Hemphill, 2003). In the 
case of France, the number of creation of biotech firms is also increasing, from fewer than 10 
new firms per year a decade ago, to more than 30 nowadays (Mangematin et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, it is undisputable that those new firms are knowledge based since biotechnology is 
widely acknowledged as a science-based and even a science-driven sector (Cohen et al., 2002). 
Another interesting feature of biotech is that new firms are almost always pure cases of 
entrepreneurship, in the sense that they are new technology based firms. Firms are built upon the 
use of a new technology or the production of a new product. They usually do not use generic 
technologies already widely developed elsewhere. Hence, we dismiss here of the problem of 
knowing whether or not the creation of a new firm can really be considered as a case of 
entrepreneurship (Metcalfe, 2004). 
 
To understand in details the process of entrepreneurship it is necessary, at least in a first step, to 
enter inside the black box. In this sense, an in depth analysis of the process of creation of four 
start-ups should bring interesting insights. Former studies on entrepreneurship showed that, even 
though the personal characteristics of the founder cannot be neglected to understand 
entrepreneurship, the latter is most of all a “systemic phenomenon driven by complementarities 
between technological, market and institutional opportunities” (Radosevic, 2005). Those 
elements are sometimes also defined as the “entrepreneurial climate”, which represents the 
constellation of factors that determine entrepreneurial activity in an economy (Tamvada, 2006). 
Specifically, we aim here at exploring the role of variables such as the personality of the founder, 
the scientific community, public go-between institutions, inter firm collaborations, patents, etc., 
in the entrepreneurship process in biotech. 
 
In order to recount the history of the foundation of each of our four cases we used different 
information sources. First of all we collected information through in depth interviews (at least 
three hours of interview) with one of the founders of each firm. Those interviews were semi-
directive and aimed at analysing the evolution of firms through time, the factors that seemed 
important to determine this evolution and the strategies of the decision makers. They enabled us 
to gather precious information about the genesis of the new venture, the characteristics of the 
founders and the trajectory of the firm after it had been erected. Those interviews have been 
completed by email or telephone exchange in May 2006. The second source of information that 
has been exploited is the answers to a postal survey sent to all Biovalley R&D companies (see 
below) in 2004 and focused on firms’ patenting and partnering activities
3. This study provides 
                                                 
3 We e-mailed a questionnaire, addressed either to the CEO, the R&D director or the intellectual property director of 
the company. We received 18 exploitable answers. This questionnaire included three main parts: One related to 
general information about the firm, such as the age of the company, its activity, its type, the total number of 
employees, the number of employees with a PhD, the function of the respondent, etc. The second part aimed at 
gathering information related to firms’ patenting strategy. We questioned firms about the number of patents they 
held, their main motivations for applying for a patent, the main deficiencies they attribute to the patent system, the 
methods they used to prevent imitation, etc. The third part aimed at gathering information related to firms’ set of 
R&D collaborations. We questioned firms about the number of R&D partnerships they had been engaged in over the 
  2information about collaboration and patenting strategies of 18 biotech firms of the Upper-Rhine 
Biovalley. Finally, additional, complementary information has been gathered via public sources 
on the Internet and via queries in patent databases. 
 
Our four firms are all part of the French side of the Upper-Rhine Biovalley network, which was 
founded in 1996. It is a trinational network strategically located in the Upper-Rhine region, which 
extends over northwest Switzerland, South-Baden in Germany and Alsace in France. This 
network gathers approximately 650 partners, of which 124 are considered as being firms doing 
R&D (other members are services and consulting companies, supply companies and public 
research institutions). Of those firms 56 are located in France but only 24 are considered as new 
biotech firms, the other being more traditional SMEs or subsidiaries of big-pharmaceutical 
companies
4. Among those 24 firms, our four firms have been selected according to specific 
criteria: To be able to make some comparisons we selected young firms (founded between year 
1999 and 2001), hosted by the local incubator and involved in the domain of human health that is 
the dominant model of the Upper-Rhine Biovalley, which has recently been selected as a “Pôle 
de compétitité innovation thérapeutique”. Hence, we believe that those four cases may reflect 
some aspects of the situation of the Biovally. Yet, to dismiss all criticisms related to possible bias 
and lack of representativeness, we insist on the fact that our purpose is not to propose general 
conclusions, which is anyway contradictory with the method of case study, but only to raise 
testable hypotheses. 
 
The first section describes each of the four cases. It is based on the interviews with the respective 
founders of the firms. Specific emphasis is put on the characteristics that seemed important to 
understand the genesis of the venture. We tried in this section to keep only with facts, i.e. to 
dismiss as much as possible our own interpretation. Then in the second part we propose a 
synthesis of those four cases and we try to infer characteristics that count to explain 
entrepreneurship in biotech
5. We insist on three points: The role of public research, which 
appears as central in all four cases; the importance of patents to launch a new biotech business in 









                                                                                                                                                              
last three years, the types of the partnership, the types of the partner, the terms of the collaboration and the purpose 
of alliances. 
4 Data for year 2004. For further information see the Biovalley website: www.biovalley.com. This amount of 24 
firms can be compared to the total number of new independent biotech firms in France. According to Catherine et al. 
(2004) estimations are converging around 200 independent biotech companies.  
5 Ideally we aim at identifying features that help to explain why entrepreneurs in biotechnology succeed or fail. Yet, 
it must be kept in mind that it is difficult to speak about success in the case of biotechnology start-ups. These are 
young firms and it is obviously not because they were still alive by the time we did the inquiry (which means that 
they were for most of them 5 or 6 years old) that they are a success. In this sense, here success means rather “still 
alive at the time of the inquiry” or “no failure for the moment”. 
  32. Four cases to apprehend entrepreneurship in biotech 
 
2.1 Firm A
6: “Success story … without the happy end” 
 
Firm A is a start-up founded in January 1999 by a Strasbourg CNRS researcher, following a 
collaboration with Aventis (now Sanofi-Synthelabo). It is therefore an academic spin-off. The 
story of Firm A starts like a success story. It raised many hopes and obtained easily important 
funding, which first led to a rapid evolution of the society. In 2001, i.e. only two years after its 
foundation, Firm A had been able to raise 30 million euros in two rounds of venture capital
7. The 
firm grew rapidly from 26 employees in 2001, 46 in 2003 and according to the business plan an 
expectation of 100-150 employees in 2006. After 18 months the firm had its first product in pre-
clinical trials, which is remarkably quick for a start-up. 
 
The strategic focus upon which firm A is based is the discovery and development of novel 
medicines and drugs derived from the biological and chemical diversity of insects. The world of 
insects represents indeed the largest and probably most diversified reservoir of native substances 
with pre-determined pharmacological activity, giving an extraordinary potential for the discovery 
of novel medicines in many areas of unmet needs including antibiotic treatments. A focus was 
put specifically on the immune response developed by insects. In complement to the development 
of new drugs Firm A also built highly chemo-diverse libraries of small molecule compounds with 
applicability to many therapeutic fields. When it was founded, Firm A was the sole firm on this 
niche. 
 
Unfortunately the society collapsed at least as rapidly as it had progressed and came to 
bankruptcy in 2005. Apparently financers had loss their hope in the society, which implies that 
Firm A was unable to raise more funds to pursue the research projects. This remarkable case 
study is therefore interesting since it reflects in itself the story of most biotech firms during the 
last ten years: hopes, easy funding before the high-tech bubble, quick growth (but usually without 
turnover), difficulty to raise funds after year 2003 and finally bankruptcy. More specifically it 
emphasises the versatility of financers who first agree to provide huge amounts of money and 
five years later refuse to reinvest. It also reflects the lag between the time horizon of research (at 
least 10 years) and the time horizon of venture capitalists (funds are usually allocated for 
approximately 5 years). 
 
Let us now turn to the detailed story of the foundation of the company. The creation of Firm A is 
the outcome of a long process that started 20 years ago with the first research carried out in the 
CNRS lab of the founder (a world leading team in the Institute of Molecular and Cellular Biology 
in Strasbourg) in collaboration with a local start-up on the immune properties of insects. Already 
at this time the founder wanted to create a venture since the financial endowments in the 
academia was not sufficient to cover the needs for his research. We find here a recurrent 
motivation of academic scholars to engage in industrial projects: The absence of public funds and 
the rigidity of their allocation. Scholars may therefore be more likely to find funds and freedom 
within a private company than within the public research system. Yet the project did not succeed 
                                                 
6 To respect the willingness of the interviewed founders, we do not disclose the name of the companies. 
7 This amount must be compared with the average amount raised in France, which stands approximately from 1 to 4 
million euros per round (« guide du financement des entreprises de biotech »).  
  4at this time (mainly for technological and market reasons but also for more unpredictable ones
8). 
A second industrial R&D collaboration occurred some time later with a US partner. This time the 
association failed because the partner was managing an entry on the stock market, which did not 
allow it to focus on new projects. A third collaboration occurred with the French firm Rhone-
Poulenc (which was later bought out by Aventis). This third collaboration succeeded on several 
points. It provided financial resources to the academic lab and it led to several patents in the 
nineties for which the lab was mentioned as the inventor and the firm as the owner
9. 
 
It is this third collaboration that led to the creation of Firm A in 1999. For strategic reasons 
Rhone-Poulenc did not intend to use the technology and agreed to give access to its patents to the 
new-founded firm for free (in exchange it entered the capital of the new company). The good 
relationship between the academic lab and the industrial partner is very important to explain the 
genesis and the initial success of the project. It implies, for instance, that the new venture was 
able to obtain the patents on which it could build its initial development for free, which is central 
for a new firm that does not have important initial funds. More importantly, the creation was 
fostered by the arrival of a researcher who was back from a two years post doc in the US and who 
played a central role in the creation. He worked in the CNRS team of the founder and when the 
latter asked him to take the project of the start-up in charge, he immediately accepted. For him 
the start-up offered a research opportunity without any equivalent in the public, where the 
budgets are low and the organisation too codified and rigid. It is almost impossible for a young 
researcher to build his own team to work on a new project. Furthermore, the French legislation 
(with the law on innovation enforced in 1999) facilitated the passage of public researchers to the 
industry: It offers the possibility for public researchers to engage in industrial activities while 
keeping their status as civil servant during six years, which means that if the industrial project 
fails the researchers can return to academia without any damage. This system provides powerful 
incentives for academic scholars to found start-ups.  
 
To complete the organisation of the new venture, Firm A also needed to hire a manager endowed 
with strong experience in the industry in order to take care of the business aspects of the project. 
Indeed, although the founder contributed to provide a solid scientific guarantee, scientific 
excellence is most of the time not sufficient to launch a new venture. Entrepreneurs must also 
prove that they are capable to handle the business side of their project, which is often not the case 
of academic scholars. This business credibility is essential to be able to raise funds and to obtain 
the trust of the investors. Firm A dealt with this problem by associating to the project a manager 
specialised in the launch of new biotech firms. This manager remained two years in the firm and 
was then replaced in 2001 by another CEO also endowed with a strong experience in the industry 
(more than 20 years). This double direction (CSO and CEO), which is common in the biotech 
sector, is a necessary condition in order to raise funds and to attract venture capital firms. 
 
                                                 
8 The person in charge of the project within the partner’s organisation died, which had a negative influence on the 
continuation of the collaboration. This point illustrates the many unpredictable things that may play positively and / 
or negatively on the success of a project. 
9 It is interesting to notice that such practices, where the public organisation abandons the full ownership to the 
industrial partner, are more controlled today. French universities have all developed technology transfer offices that 
manage interactions with industries and usually insist on co-ownership of patents. Yet this practice was common in 
the past. It is one of the purposes of the Keins project to estimate how many patents have been invented by French 
academic scholars, which should give an idea of the exact role of French public research for industrial innovations. 
  5The company was therefore founded in 1999 and hosted by the local incubator in Strasbourg. As 
described above, it first experienced a quick growth and was able to raise important amount of 
money before going bankrupt in 2005. 
 
The story of Firm A emphasises several elements that may help to understand entrepreneurship in 
biotech: A first feature is related to the importance of informal personal relationships and to the 
charisma of the founder. The latter was a famous researcher who developed during his career 
many relationships with industrialists and financers. His “know-who” was then useful to 
convince Aventis Crop-science to enter into the game, to find adequate collaborators and most of 
all to convince financers to invest. A second element deals with the importance of developing 
links with other organisations. The foundation of Firm A is a collective process that involved 
many partners: The CNRS, Aventis, Venture capitalists and local institutions such as ANVAR 
and the local incubator. The case also emphasises the role of the patent system for new start-ups 
since the creation of the start-up is directly linked to the exclusive licensing of several patents 
from Aventis Cropscience. Those patents proved very important to give credibility to the new 
firm. During its short life Firm A pursed an intense patenting strategy, which enabled it to gather 
a small patent portfolio of more than 15 patents
10. 
 
To conclude with this case, let us try to propose a likely explanation of the failure of Firm A. The 
project on which the company was erected, although very promising in the long run, was too far 
from the market to be undertaken by a private firm. It was still a research program rather than an 
industrial project likely to yield money on a short spell of time. And, as stressed by Nelson 
(1959), although firms often undertake basic research and universities often do applied research, 
public research organisations have a comparative advantage in basic research as compared with 
private companies. In this sense the research undertaken by Firm A has still to be matured within 
the public sphere before being industrialised again, maybe in several years. 
 
2.2 Firm B: “Simple, sober and efficient (… until now)” 
 
Firm B is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the discovery and development of innovative 
treatments for psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, depression or anxiety. The company 
was founded in 2000 by three persons and is currently based in Mulhouse. Today it has two 
compounds in clinical trials phases II and I and several compounds in pre-clinical trials. It has 
about 40 employees, has been able to raise quickly important amount of money and has applied 
for several patents recently. The future of the company is considered with optimism since it is 
located on a promising market (psychiatric diseases), which should sharply develop in the future, 
and it has a pipeline of new compounds that have the potential to overcome the limitations of 
current drug therapies. In 2005 the company was selected as one of the top 100 (including 19 
biotech firms) most promising (i.e. best-performing and innovative) high-tech private companies 
of Europe. 
 
The project on which the company was erected is simple: To combine competences in drug 
discovery and clinical trials in order to accelerate the time needed to bring a new drug on the 
market. To put it differently, the objective of the company is to ensure a rapid transfer of 
compounds from their discovery to clinical trials phase IIb and then to sell or licence them. Firm 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, we have not been able to discover what happened to those patents after the bankruptcy. 
  6B core competences are therefore not based on a new technology or a product but rather on a new 
type of organisation that enables the company to decrease the time needed to bring promising 
compounds to clinical trials phase III and with much lower attrition rate than industry standards. 
Apparently the organisation of Firm B enables the company to save time and money. To do this, 
Firm B relies on its privileged links with public research, which brings its scientific competences 
in the process of discovering rationally new promising compounds, and on its competences 
related to pre-clinical trials and to the first stages of clinical trials. At its very beginning Firm B 
was therefore a virtual company that selected new compounds and then subcontracted the pre-
clinical and clinical trials to other firms
11. Another important activity of Firm B is to survey the 
portfolio of other companies in order to identify promising compounds that would not be used by 
those companies and to buy them. This has allowed them to acquire the currently most promising 
compound of the company in-licensed from Janssen Pharmaceuticals (Johnson & Johnson) and 
that is now in clinical trial phase II. 
 
Let us now turn to the story of the foundation of the company: Before all, the creation of Firm B 
relies on a long collaboration (and even friendship) between two of the co-founders, one 
specialised in drug discovery and one in clinical trials. The first one is a CNRS research director 
at the faculty of pharmacy of the Université Louis Pasteur (Strasbourg 1) and medicinal chemist 
specialised in neuroscience. During his career he has developed a strong experience of patenting 
and of collaboration with industry. The second one is a psychiatrist working for a company 
specialised in clinical trials on diseases of the central nervous system. Since each of them 
occupies a position at one extreme of the chain that leads to a drug (from basic research and drug 
discovery to clinical trials) they decided to associate their competences in order to develop an 
organisation that would optimise the time from drug discovery to market. A third person, who 
had developed a strong experience in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, was then 
associated to the project to take care of all the managerial and financial aspects (he became the 
CEO of the company). 
 
The company was therefore founded in September 2000 and benefited from the help of the local 
incubator that hosted it in its building in Strasbourg. It is only in February 2004 that the company 
moved into new headquarters in Mulhouse. Since is creation Firm B has experienced a constant 
progression. In November 2000 the company obtained a first financing of 7,6 million euros 
which enabled it to start on a solid basis. In August 2002 a second round of financing of 20 
million euros was successfully closed. Finally, in December 2004, a third round of financing of 
31,5 million euros was completed. Since 2000, Firm B has therefore been able to raise more than 
55 million euros, which reflects the steady trust granted by the financers to the project. Beyond 
the amount of the funding, what is really remarkable is that Firm B was able to raise funds at a 
time (year 2004) when financers were very pessimistic and usually refused to engage in early 
projects. Firm B is one of the sole French Start-ups that was able to raise an important amount of 
money in 2004. Among others, the new company relied at its beginning on several innovating 
                                                 
11 Yet, in 2003 Firm B absorbed a local company founded in 1996 and specialised in pre-clinical trials, which means 
that firm B is now able to do pre-clinical trials themselves. The buyout is not a denial of the prime strategy of Firm B 
as a virtual society but rather results from an unexpected opportunity that the society decided to seize. The company 
that was acquired, as a subcontractor doing pre-clinical trials, was one of the main partners of Firm B. It experienced 
difficulties and the integration within Firm B was one of the sole opportunities for the company to pursue its 
activities. The integration was facilitated by the strong complementarities between the two societies. 
  7projects that resulted from the past collaboration among the co-founders. Quickly it applied for 
several patents and, most of all, in May 2002, Firm B in-licensed ocaperidone, which was a 
product that the company believed to be promising but was not exploited by the owner. The first 
results about this compound that is now in clinical trials phase II were released in 2005 and are 
promising. As it is now the company is looking for a big pharmaceutical company to absorb it or 
to develop a partnership. 
 
At this stage it is not possible to predict the future of the company and to evaluate its chances of 
success but we can nevertheless raise some points that seem to have played an important role in 
the creation and the early success of the company
12. First of all, the strong relationship between 
the founders played here a key role, which emphasises the importance of informal relationships 
and networking. Second point, this case stresses the core role of science in biotechnology. A 
recurrent point that has been raised all along the interview is that Firm B is strongly dependent on 
its relationship with ULP and CNRS, which provide new promising compounds to be tested as 
well as the scientific credibility of the project. Third point, the role played by public institutions 
and most notably the incubator. Fourth, the role of patents: When it was created the company did 
not hold any patents but quickly applied for two patents based on the former researches of its two 
co-founders. Therefore, if Firm B was founded without any patent ex ante, they quickly realised 
the importance of patents, which are central in the business of Firm B (basically to buy projects at 
early stages of development and to sell them at later stages): without patents there is almost no 
trade possible. Fifth, the initial organisation of the firm was based on a double direction with a 
CEO and a CSO. This leads to our last point, which is the strong experience and charisma of the 
three founders. 
 
2.3 Firm C: “An Embryo that never developed”  
 
Firm C is not properly a firm. It is only a project of a firm that never really started for several 
reasons that we develop below. Firm C is a project of a start-up carried-on by a single founder in 
the domain of functional proteomics. The objective of the company was to develop a database of 
interactions among proteins. To this purpose, Firm C applied for a patent over a technique of 
identification of those interactions (phage-display technique
13). The advantage of this technique 
is that it reduces greatly the time to identify relevant proteins for specific uses because it allows 
simultaneous tests of interactions among different proteins. In short, Firm C aimed at becoming a 
producer of information (i.e. research tools) to be used by other firms engaged in life science. 
Potential customers are: Big-pharmaceutical firms for their activities of screening of new 
compounds, producers of bio-chips, Public research centers for their research on metabolism and 
biotech start-ups engaged in molecular interactions. At the time of the foundation, Firm C had 
only one competitor engaged in the same activity. 
                                                 
12 To temper a little bit the optimism that may come out of this presentation, it is worth mentioning that the most 
important steps are still ahead. The company is fragile and depends strongly on the results of the clinical trials of its 
compound and most notably the one in phase II. Bad results would for sure announce the end of the society in a more 
or less short spell of time. 
13 Phage display is a powerful technique for identifying proteins or peptides that bind to particular molecules of 
interest. Antibody phage display has become a popular method for identifying and selecting novel molecules for 
therapeutic and diagnostic drug development. Screening large populations of antibody molecules with phage display 
can rapidly identify which individual antibodies bind to selected targets 
(http://www.xoma.com/technologies_for_licensing/antibody_phage_display.jsp) 
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Firm C is a corporate spin-off in the sense that it was initiated by an employee working for 
another firm. The idea of the project dates back to June 2000. The founder was a technician 
working for Transgene (where he spent 8 years), which offered a stimulating research 
environment. Employees were encouraged to participate in conferences, to interact with 
universities, etc. Following one of those conferences on phage-display and an ensuing in-depth 
discussion with a Transgene expert, the founder decided to engage in this project and to apply for 
a patent that would cover this new technique. His motivation to found a new venture was 
apparently not related with money. It had more to do with Schumpeter mark I type of 
motivations: the willingness to build something, to launch a new business. Most of all, it seems 
that the founder had understood that in its former company most favourable positions would 
always be offered to employees more qualified and that his progression within the hierarchy 
would be difficult due to his lack of university background
14. 
 
Transgene, which might become a user of the technique once the latter would be operational, did 
not intend to explore it at this time. Hence, they did not deter the project and agreed to abandon 
any right over the future patent. With the help of the local biotech network (Alsace Biovalley), 
which provided technical and financial expertise as well as contacts with relevant institutions, a 
French patent application was completed in March 2001
15,16. At this early stage the project did 
benefit only marginal financial support: A grant of 6,000 euros from Alsace Biovalley. 
Nevertheless it benefited from other kinds of support, such as the right to enter the local incubator 
(usually limited to public research valorisation) at the end of year 2000. The help of incubators is 
important since it gives scientific credibility to the project, especially to attract funds
17. 
Furthermore it provides assistance to develop the project in more depth, which enabled the 
founder to prepare a business plan and a market study to submit to financers and to partners. It is 
also important to stress that during year 2001 the founder decided to quit his former company to 
be able to spend more time on his project. 
 
Once the patent application was completed, Firm C really started to exist and could try to 
approach financers and partners (without patents the society cannot really exist since there is 
nothing tangible to propose to partners). The business plan established for the company was 
based on a realistic scenario: Low initial investments, expectation of reasonable benefits already 
after the third year of activity and the hiring of only 7 employees. Hence, according to this 
roadmap, Firm C had to find funds and a scientific partner endowed with a strong reputation. Yet, 
despite an association with a university professor in pharmaceuticals located in the Netherlands, 
Firm C failed to raise more money either from venture capital firms, from business angels or 
                                                 
14 A feature that played a central role in the story of Firm C is that the founder was not entitled with a university 
PhD. Originally he had a BTS, which means in the French system that he is a technician and not an engineer or a 
doctor. Furthermore, during the 8 years spent in Transgene he attended at the same time a university training that 
provided him with an MBA. 
15 Due to a lack of financial resources Firm C did not use its priority right to apply for patents in other countries than 
France. 
16 During the interview the founder stressed the importance of the assistance he received from the incubator and the 
IP firm to complete the drafting of the patent application. 
17 Yet, incubators remain most of all units of valorisation of public research. For outsiders (i.e. non public 
researchers) it is harder to benefit fully from this support. This remark of Firm C founder is consistent with the 
importance of informal relationship for entrepreneurs in biotech. Formal support is worth less if it is not 
accompanied by informal links. 
  9from public institutions. Finally, at the end of year 2002 (2 years after its beginning) the project 
to create a new firm was abandoned and the priority of the founder was redirected towards a more 
modest objective: To sell his patent in order to be reimbursed for all the expenditures he had 
engaged during the project
18. 
 
This story of a failure is nevertheless very instructive to understand entrepreneurship in biotech. 
Putting aside the eventuality that the project was just unworkable and doomed to fail one can 
stress the following points to explain the failure: First of all, scientific credibility and the 
reputation of the founder are central. In the case of Firm C, the founder did not have any network 
to mobilise either in the scientific or in the business communities. He did not have a PhD, did not 
work in a prestigious university and had no real experience of management. Even in the case of a 
promising project this lack of experience and credibility can easily explain the reluctance of 
partners and financers to participate. Had the founder been from a prestigious research team with 
links with other start-ups, it is likely that he would have been able to gather more funds. 
 
Another feature that emerges from this failure deals with the professional situation of the founder. 
It suggests that corporate spin-offs not explicitely backed by the mother firm are confronted with 
more difficulties than academic spin-offs. In the case of Firm C, the founder had to deal with a 
precarious and uncertain personal situation. He was finally obliged to quit his former firm a few 
months after the beginning of the project, which does not provide good conditions to ensure the 
success of a young venture (he did nevertheless find another job a few months after he stopped 
his project). Conversely, as already discussed above, had the founder been a civil servant working 
for a public research center he would have been able to quit his function and to be reintegrated in 
case of failure. This provides steadier situations that especially allow entrepreneurs to mature 
their projects and to manage the time dimension differently. In the case of Firm C it is certain that 
time was a central factor. The project needed to be launched quickly, which may have affected its 
quality. 
 
Finally, a peculiar point may also explain the failure to raise funds at that time: The lack of 
ambitions of the project. Contrary to traditional economic theory, it seems that in the economics 
of biotech, the higher the amount requested the more financers are willing to invest. This can be 
explained by the lack of scientific competences from the financers, who are therefore unable to 
assess the true value of the project, and by their willingness to “dream” (this was emphasised in 
all four interviews). Hence, realistic projects may eventually be penalised as compared with other 
less realistic but more ambitious ones. Yet, in the case of Firm C it is doubtful that had the 
project been more ambitious, financers would have invested in it. 
 
2.4 Firm D: “cautiously but surely” 
 
Firm D was founded in 2001. It is focused on the development of reagents for intracellular 
delivery of biomolecules. In clear, the company develops and commercialises chemical based 
vectors that serve to transfer genes or other bio-molecules (proteins for instance) within cells in-
vivo or in-vitro. Compared to viruses, which are usually used to this purpose, chemical based 
vectors provided by Firm D have several advantages. Among others, they do not trigger 
undesired side-effects and they experience a lower failure rate. 
                                                 
18 Unfortunately we have not been able to find out whether or not the founder succeeded in selling his patent. 
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Before going in more depth into the history of the company, it is important to understand that 
transfection, the business in which Firm D is actively engaged, is central to the future 
development of the biotech sector. Gene therapy has raised huge hopes in the past but due to 
several negative and unexpected results during clinical trials it is now in a dead-end. Scientific 
and technological problems as well as a negative perception by the general public prevent 
financers from investing in the sector. It is widely acknowledged among scholars that one of the 
major issues for leading gene therapy out of the crisis it encounters actually is related to the 
vectorisation of the gene into the cell. This emphasises the importance and the potentialities of 
the research led by Firm D should they prove to be workable. 
 
Firm D stems from a mixed team from the world of science and of industry. It was founded by 
the association of a CNRS research director with a person who had an experience in industry and 
who became the CEO of the company (she is still the CEO today). The CNRS research director 
wanted to valorise one of his patents (owned by the CNRS), which was not used by any firm at 
the time. This valorisation was of course not possible within the public domain. It is important to 
note here that it is not only a matter of money or of freedom of research that induced him to 
found Firm D but also the willingness to make research undertaken in the public domain useful to 
the general public (to remove them from the shelves).  
 
Everything happened very rapidly after the meeting of the two co-founders: The firm was 
founded in January 2001. It had been licensed two exclusive patents from the CNRS, which soon 
started to yield some money. Furthermore, in June 2001 Firm D raised 600,000 euros after the 
first round of financing which, coupled with the revenues of the exploitation of the CNRS 
licences, contributed to ensure the financial viability of the project. Those funds were 
accompanied by several public subsidies. Public institutions not only provided funds but also 
supported the project by hosting the company in the local incubator. It is only recently (in June 
2004) that the society left the incubator to new buildings near Strasbourg. In July 2004 a second 
round of financing still consolidated the firm by yielding 2 million euros. Furthermore, in 2002 
Firm D was awarded ISO 9001: 2000 quality management system certification, which is an 
element worthy to emphasise since it is rather rare for biotech firms that are usually satisfied with 
GMP norms. 
 
The growth of the firm since its foundation has been constant: From 4 employees in 2001 it has 
grown to about 20 employees now and displayed a turnover of 750,000 euros in 2003 and 
797,000 euros in 2004. This turnover is still expected to increase in the following years due to an 




One of the most interesting element of Firm D’s case is related to the strategy adopted by the 
firm since its beginning: Contrary to many other biotech start-ups, Firm D has adopted a mixed 
business model, i.e. a strategy of development that relies on a coupling of risky research 
investments (which can lead to important profits in the long run) with the sales of vectors to other 
research companies (which ensure a part of the financing of the firm’s research). Thus Firm D 
                                                 
19 One of the main concerns of Firm D is to enforce its patent rights on its vectors, which is usually very difficult in 
the case of process innovations. 
  11plays on two sides: (i) Commercialisation of reliable vectors and (ii) Active participation in 
ambitious research programs to find treatments to diseases such as cancer or Aids. 
 
(i) First of all, Firm D has developed a wide network of distributors all around the world to 
ensure the commercialisation of its vectors. As a first step the firm therefore strongly relies on the 
exploitation of the initial CNRS patents. Yet, distribution cannot be done independently from 
research since according to the specific needs of each customer the relevant vector may change. 
Hence, Firm D does not provide a single vector but adapts its vectors according to the specific 
needs of the customer. Potential customers are all types of organisations that carry on research in 
life science and that need to transfer bio-molecules within cells (among others for clinical trials). 
This can be either big pharmaceutical and biotech firms (that need vectors during clinical trials 
among others) or public research centers that need vectors to carry on their researches. The 
relevance of the distribution policy of Firm D is illustrated by its trade with foreign firms. In 
2004, 70% of the turnover was realised with foreign firms. This strategy focused on intermediary 
products and services explains the low financial need of Firm D as compared to other firms 
involved in drug development. 
 
(ii) Firm D’ strategy of cash –flow is coupled with a more ambitious one, focused on research. 
Firm D participates in several research projects (vaccine against Aids and Cancer) for which they 
provide the vector. For instance, recent clinical trials on bladder cancer carried out in the US and 
using a vector provided by Firm D gave very interesting results in phase I. Those investments in 
R&D determine the future value of the firm. Thus, the two strategies are in some sense 
complementary and ensure the viability of the firm over the long run. The revenues that stem 
from the sales of vectors finance in part the research program of the firm. The company invests 
about half its revenues in research and development. Those investments in R&D are necessary to 
develop constant improvement of existing solutions as well as original products. 
 
Among the other elements that are worth mentioning in the case of Firm D, patents occupy a 
central place. The creation of Firm D is entirely based on patents held by CNRS and exclusively 
licensed to Firm D, which aimed first at exploiting those patents. Would not the CNRS have 
applied for patents it is likely that Firm D would not have been founded. A second very important 
element is the role of the scientific community. Firm D stems from the world of science and still 
interacts heavily with its former community. Public research is essential for Firm D at two levels: 
First due to its scientific excellence it is a partner that cannot be ignored by firms involved in 
ambitious research programs. Second, it is also a potential customer for Firm D since public labs 
are likely to need in their experiences the vectors produced by Firm D. Finally, a third element 
central to understand the creation of the venture consists in informal links among individuals. The 
two founders knew and appreciated each other long before the creation of the venture. 
 
 
3. What can we learn from those cases? 
 
Now that we have presented the history and the characteristics of the four firms, let us try to 
make a synthesis and infer some characteristics regarding entrepreneurship in biotech. This 
discussion, although based on detailed qualitative empirical findings, is necessarily a speculative 
one. Yet, several insights come out of our four cases. Overall, they allow emphasising three main 
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patents and the importance of formal and informal links. 
 
3.1 The key role of public research 
 
One element put forward by all the four cases is the prominent role of public research for new 
biotech start-ups. Many new biotech firms stem from the academic community (are academic 
spin-off or at least are mixed structure from the academia and industry) and even for those that 
are not, it is central to establish strong links and to collaborate with public labs. This central role 
of public research in the development of the biotech industry was already emphasised by Zucker 
et al. (1998), who showed that in the US during the early days of the biotech industry, between 
1976 and 1989, there was a strong positive correlation among the local presence of a university 
and the development of biotech start-ups. 
 
Table 1: Synthesis of the four cases 
 
  Year of 
foundation 
Spin-off  Patent  Initial 
Organisation 
Domain  Incubator 
Firm A  1999  Academic  Yes  CSO+CEO  Human 
health 
Yes 
Firm B  2000  Mixed  Yes  CSO+CEO  Human 
health 
Yes 





Firm D  2001  Mixed  Yes  CSO+CEO  Human 
health 
Yes 
















Firm B  High  Strong  Yes  Product - Drug  
LR 
Developed Alive 




Firm D  Modest  Strong  Yes  Mixed 




Our interviews especially stress the advantages that public researchers have to create their own 
venture. First, since biotech is a science based industry in which scientific knowledge is central 
and may provide firms with an important competitive advantage, it is obvious that researchers 
who work in centers of excellence are more likely to create a new venture because they possess 
the appropriate scientific knowledge. Biotech firms cannot be disconnected from science and 
usually good science is undertaken in public research centers. As scientists, public researchers 
have therefore a strong advantage to engage into new potentially valuable projects. 
 
  13Another important feature is related to the risk supported by the researcher. It appeared all along 
our interviews that the French system, which enables public researchers to quit their employment 
for a time and to reintegrate it afterwards, provides a powerful incentive for public researchers to 
launch into new and risky businesses. As a comparison, a researcher working for a private 
company would have to quit his job definitely. Moreover, a maybe more important reason deals 
with the management of the time dimension. Being a public researcher enables the founder to 
mature his project whereas other researchers may have more difficulties to handle the time 
dimension of their project correctly. 
 
These elements may explain why many biotech start-ups are academic spin-offs. Three firms out 
of the four we study are either academic spin-offs or have at least one founder from the academia. 
Firm A is an academic spin-off. Firm D and Firm B are mixed organisations stemming partly 
from the academia. Only Firm C does not come from public research and this seems to have 
strongly penalised its development. This is in line with other results from studies in France. To 
mention only one realised in the Paris region by Bellon and Plunket, in 2003, out of 64 biotech 
firms founded since 1990, 40 firms had at least one founder from the academia. Academic spin-
offs represent therefore 2/3 of the new biotech firms. More specifically, 19 firms resulted directly 
from the public sector (INRA, CNRS, CEA, IP) and 21 had one public researcher among the 
founders (Bellon and Plunket, 2005). These statistics confirm the central role of universities in 
the technological process. This role had for long been denied, at least in Europe
20, but most 
recent studies that use more appropriate indicators tend to acknowledge the importance of public 
research organisation to produce technological knowledge
21. 
 
Catherine et al. (2004) refined those results on the role played by scientists in the creation of new 
biotech ventures. Based on the analysis of 132 founders of 62 French biotech start-ups, they 
emphasised three points: First, they show that academic founders with a high level of academic 
production usually do not enter the new venture but have a part time or scientific advisor 
position. This situation is illustrated here with the case of Firm A, for which the founder did not 
become the CSO but delegated one researcher from his academic team. Second, they show that 
non scientific founders are more likely to have a position as CEO or in the top management, 
which again is consistent with our finding about the organisation of a biotech start-up with two 
heads: A CEO occupied by a person with a strong experience in industry and a CSO occupied by 
a scientists usually coming from the academia. Finally, they find out that more productive 
scientists tend to create riskier start-ups, which is also consistent with the case of Firm A. 
 
A second element that comes out of our interviews and that support the centrality of public 
research is the importance for new ventures to collaborate with public research centers. The four 
firms interviewed acknowledged explicitly the importance of their collaboration with the 
academia. For instance, looking at the case of Firm C, it seems that a central reason to explain 
                                                 
20 We can mention, for instance, the European research paradox which postulates that, as compared to the US, 
Europe would do efficient basic research but would be bad in transforming this research into industrial progress (see 
Dosi et al., 2005, for an analysis of this paradox). 
21 In terms of patent applications, for instance, it was long considered that public research centers did not patent 
enough because the statistics considered the number of patents owned by public research organisation. Yet, it is 
much more appropriate to consider the number of patents invented by public researchers whether or not owned by 
public research institutions. By doing this, one can demonstrate that contrary to common belief public research is 
very active in terms of patenting (Verspagen, 2006). 
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lacked a strong reputation within the scientific community. He was not part of the academic 
community and, although he had collaboration with a scientist from Holland, he had no 
collaborations with famous academic scientists. Had this founder been a doctor coming from 
university, or at least had he been endowed with a strong reputation within the scientific 
community, it is likely that it would have been easier for him to convince partners. The 
importance of developing links with science is also emphasised by the answers to our 
questionnaire, which showed that most of the new biotech firms in the Upper-Rhine Biovalley do 
collaborate with public labs
22 (Bureth et al., 2005). 
 
Why are collaborations with public research organisation important? First, collaboration with 
university is central to increase firms’ reputation and to achieve scientific credibility. Here, 
collaborations essentially aim at increasing the firms’ attractiveness for financers or potential 
partners. Star scientists among others, by their ability to bridge different communities, ensure to 
the entrepreneur the scientific visibility necessary in order to collect fund and to develop 
collaborations (Zucker and Darby, 1999). 
 
Second, and most important, being involved with public researchers is essential to have access to 
relevant scientific knowledge. Universities are indeed important sources of scientific knowledge 
and developing links with public labs enable biotech firms to access this knowledge more easily. 
This explanation is in line with the analysis of Zucker et al. (1998), who attribute the central role 
of public research organisations during the birth of the biotech industry essentially to the tacit 
nature of the scientific knowledge (at least during the emerging phase of the industry): “We 
believe that at least for the first 10 or 15 years the innovations which underlie biotechnology are 
properly analysed in terms of natural excludable knowledge held by a small initial group of 
discoverers their co-workers and others who learned the knowledge by working at the bench 
science level with those possessing the know how. Ultimately this knowledge spreads enough to 
become part of routine science in the industry” (Zucker et al., 1998). Hence firms need to 
collaborate with universities in order to access sticky knowledge on which they can base their 
development. The authors conclude by claiming that their finding: “provides new insights into 
the role of research universities and their top scientists as central to the formation of new high-
tech industries”. 
 
This discussion about the role of tacit knowledge in determining the importance of public science 
leads us to a central hypothesis: For new biotech venture the importance of establishing links 
with public science would be correlated with the degree of emergence of the industry. The 
younger the industry the more important it is to be connected with public research centers in 
order to benefit tacit knowledge developed within the public sphere. Once the industry becomes 
stable, knowledge becomes more easily available, which decreases the importance of direct links 
with public science. In short, the central role of public science for new biotech venture in Europe 
would be due to the relative novelty of the sector and should decrease through time. The Upper-
Rhine Biovalley, for instance, is an emergent cluster, which may explain the central role played 
                                                 
22 The importance given to public research by firms in the Alsace Biovalley may be explained by the presence of the 
Université Louis Pasteur, one of the world leading universities in life sciences (Levy, 2005). It is possible that the 
presence of this university generates a bias and leads to overestimate the role of science in the Upper-Rhine 
Biovalley. 
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establishing links with public science. Conversely, in the US the industry is older and clusters are 
usually already stable, which may trigger a relative decrease of the importance of public research 
centers. As explained by Zucker et al., in the case of stable cluster, “knowledge spreads enough 
to become part of routine science in the industry”, which decreases the importance of being 
connected with universities. This hypothesis, which must still be validated, is in line with the 
work of Cohendet et al. (2006). Those authors also stress the prominence of sticky knowledge 
during the first phase of an industry which, during the first years of an industry moves firms’ 
strategic goal from logic of exclusion and protection (that are dominant in stable industry) to 
logic of collaboration and coordination. 
 
3.2 Patents: Essential or not? 
 
Another element that comes out from all four interviews is the major role played by the patent 
system within the process of creating the new venture. All four firms did hold patents. 
Furthermore, for three firms out of the four, patents were directly involved in the creation of the 
company. For Firm D and Firm A it is a patent transfer from a public research organisation to the 
new venture that ensured the foundation while for Firm C the patent application was the first and 
necessary step towards the creation. For those three firms it is likely that without patents there 
would have been no firm creation. Only for Firm B did a patent not precede the foundation but 
occurred some time after. Overall, patents are omnipresent within all four cases. 
 
These results are in line with many empirical studies suggesting that the most important asset for 
entrepreneurship in biotech is patent and that without patents there would have few investments 
in biotech (Federal Trade Commission, 2003). The prominent role of patents in biotech goes back 
to the origin of the sector. There is indeed a strong correlation between the birth of the industry 
and important changes in patent laws, which suggests that patents played a central role in the 
birth and development of the biotech industry. It is possible that without the patent system the 
biotechnology revolution would not have reached the dimension it has nowadays. Two changes 
related to patent legislation may have encouraged the emergence of an industry in biotechnology: 
The Bayh-Dole Act in the United States
23 and the 1980 US Supreme Court decision Diamond vs. 




                                                 
23 The Bayh-Dole act established in 1980 that US universities were allowed to apply for patents and most of all to 
own patents, even though the research that led to the patent had mainly been financed by public funds. Before this 
law, universities could apply for patents but those patents were then owned by the State, which made the incentives 
for universities to use the patent very low. The Bayh-Dole act was even reinforced in 1984, when it was decided that 
public research organisations were allowed to grant exclusive exploitation licences to firms in order to exploit public 
research, even though the latter was financed mainly with public money. Officially this law intended to spur the 
industrial exploitation of public research. 
24 In 1974, Dr Chakrabarty applied for a US patent on a genetically modified bacterium. His demand was first 
rejected, the court considering that living organisms were not patentable. However, the case was brought before the 
US Supreme Court, which decided in 1980, by 5 votes against 4, to validate the patent. It is therefore the highest 
court of the most powerful country in the world that decided that living organisms can be patented under some 
conditions. Since then, it is considered that “anything under the sun that is made [and not only invented] by the hand 
of man” can be patented. In France, pieces of the human organism, like genes for instance, cannot be patented as 
such but only if the applicant has identified a precise use for them. 
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university patenting in the US (Mowery et al., 2001 ; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Sampat and 
Mazzoleni, 2002), in the specific case of life sciences, it is likely that this law had major 
consequences. Biotechnology is indeed a science-driven sector. Almost all the pioneer 
discoveries in this domain have emerged from public organisations. Furthermore, the industrial 
exploitation of this research (to turn them into marketable items) is an uncertain and costly 
activity. It is thus unlikely that entrepreneurs would have agreed to invest in this business without 
being protected by patents. By being public and thus available to everybody, public research in 
the field of biotechnology was of no interest for businessmen. The fact that they became 
patentable and that exclusive licences could be granted to entrepreneurs appeared therefore as a 
necessary step to launch the business in this industry. Without patents it is possible that much 
socially profitable research would have remained on the shelves of public labs. 
 
In life sciences, and contrary to most other sectors, it has indeed been shown that patents are 
highly important to appropriate the returns of an innovation and to enhance incentives (Levin et 
al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Combs and Metcalfe, 2002). Firms acting specifically in 
biotechnologies are usually small and young companies faced with high competitive pressures 
and thus they strongly rely on patents because they do not have any other tangible asset. Without 
patents those firms would have no guarantee to offer to potential partners and to financing 
institutions. 
 
Biotechnology companies may apply for patents not only in order to exclude rival firms but also 
to facilitate collaborations and interactions (Bureth et al., 2005). Patents are central instruments 
of coordination in an environment composed of multiple and heterogeneous actors and in which 
interactions are complex (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998; Thumm, 2001). Three types of actors 
perform research in biotechnology: New Biotechnology Firms (NBF), Public Research Centres 
(PRC) and Big Pharmaceutical Firms (BPF). Around them many other actors do not directly 
perform research but are involved in the innovation process, such as financing institutions, patent 
offices, consulting companies, etc. In such a context, patents are crucial in order to overcome the 
strongly differentiated bargaining power and the diverging incentive schemes of these actors. 
They are also a necessary condition to access the market since they reassure customers and 
partners and constitute the core of the negotiations with other actors. Furthermore, considering 
the multiplication of the players, patents (through the disclosure they entail) provide the 
possibility for entrepreneurs who founded start-ups and small size firms to signal competences 
and to facilitate the valorisation of complementarities, both in terms of financial and of 
technological resources (Pénin, 2005). Finally, patents allow the separation of inventors and 
exploiters of the innovation (separation of a market for ideas and a market for products), allowing 
gains in specialisation by the respective entities (Gans and Stern, 2003). In this context, the 
inexistence of patents would mean that the same entity would have to be both the exploiter and 
the inventor. 
 
All the above arguments suggest that patents are essential for entrepreneurship in biotech. Yet, 
two comments may soften this conclusion: First, it is obvious that the fact that firms in the field 
massively apply for patents does not automatically imply that patents are sufficient to succeed in 
biotechnology. This is illustrated, for instance, by the case of Firm C, which although it had been 
granted a patent nevertheless went bankrupt. Patents alone do not necessarily open all the doors. 
Second, in apparent contrast with the above discussion, patent statistics indicate that many firms 
  17active in biotech do not hold patents. For instance, a search on the INPI database (covering all 
European patent application) for all the firms identified in the Alsace Biovalley directory shows 
that most firms in this directory did never apply for a patent
25. Only 8 firms out of the 24 new 
independent biotech firms in Alsace have applied for a patent. 
 
To summarise, on the one hand there is a bundle of studies and theoretical elements that suggest 
that patents are essential for biotech entrepreneurs and, on the other hand, we have statistics that 
indicate that many firms considered as biotech do not apply for patents. How can we reconcile 
those two positions? One possible way, but this is purely speculative, is to distinguish between 
the different business models adopted by the firms. It may indeed be possible to draw an analogy 
with the software sector and the open source software movement, which has been well 
documented recently (Lerner and Tirole, 2001; Jullien and Zimermann, 2006). Literature about 
the Business models adopted by firms involved in the OSS movement shows that, whereas the 
underlying software is open source, i.e. anyone can view and copy it, firm’s revenue is entirely 
based on the services that it provides complementary to the software such as installation, teaching 
manuals, teaching courses, customisation and security, etc. Firms that join the OSS movement 
usually make money by providing services associated with the software and not by selling the 
software, which therefore does not need to be protected. 
 
This distinction between services and products may also be relevant to explain the differentiated 
use of patents in biotech. The importance that firms grant to patents may be related to the 
business model they adopt. Firms, such as firm A and Firm B, that are engaged into a product 
business model that consists in producing new drugs rely strongly on patents. Conversely, firms 
that are engaged into services (such as tests and clinical trials) or non drug products (such as 
diagnostic kits) may grant less importance to patents, since their core competence is mainly tacit. 
This hypothesis is partly illustrated by the case of Firm D: Although Firm D do hold patents and 
considers them as central, they also acknowledged in the interview that they could survive (at 
least for their strategy of vector commercialisation) without patents. In this case they would sell 
less vectors but they could still make money due to their technological excellence. This is clearly 
not the case of companies involved in drug production such as Firm A and Firm B, which rely 
heavily on patents. In conclusion, we have raised here an important hypothesis that is worthwhile 
going into in more depth: The way in which biotech firms rely on patents would depend on their 
business model, which explains why the extent to which firms rely on patents is very different 






The phenomenon of entrepreneurship in biotech, with the multiplicity of small new ventures it 
has generated, has often been perceived as a renaissance (as compared with the big traditional 
                                                 
25 Yet, our feeling is that many firms reported in the Biovalley directory as R&D firms are not doing research in 
biotechnology. Certainly some firms may be classified as doing research while they are just drug manufacturers or 
services providers. 
26 In this paper we use the expression distributed entrepreneurship to illustrate the fact that the entrepreneurial 
activity is not retained into the hand of a single individual but is distributed among across many institutions. Yet the 
economic and managerial literature proposes many different terminologies -such as distributed, dispersed, collective 
or diffused entrepreneurship- that are often used to refer to the same thing. 
  18pharmaceutical companies) of the entrepreneur-hero that Schumpeter had in mind in his seminal 
book “Theory of Economic Development” (1911). To quote Radosevic (2005): The entrepreneur 
would be “a heroic almost Nietzschean type of lonely individual who faces resistance to 
innovation and who is driven by non utilitarian motives”. In line with this description, biotech 
start-ups are usually founded by a small number of persons (often a single individual) who 
personally assume the direction of the project. Motivations of those founders, which are often not 
only profit oriented, and the recourse to credit to launch the business are also in line with 
Schumpeter’s early view. Our four case studies, which all insist on the charisma and the 
experience of the founders, partly confirm this analysis. Our founders are all individuals endowed 
with a strong experience either scientific or managerial. Hence, according to this view, the revival 
of small business and self-employment world-wide may announce a reversal of the trend 
concerning the nature of entrepreneurship, from Schumpeter mark II (the managed economy that 
started at the turn of the 20
th century, see Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2005) to Schumpeter mark I 
(an entrepreneurial economy). 
 
Yet, this view of entrepreneurship ignores interdependences between the multiple actors of 
innovation. It comes from a deep misunderstanding of entrepreneurship in biotech, which is 
mainly a collective process that relies on the assembling of competences distributed across a 
large number of agents. The entrepreneur is not a single agent but belongs to a network and has to 
interact with other members to succeed in his enterprise. In short, the locus of innovation has 
shifted from individual organisations to networks (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Powell, 1996; 
Baum et al., 2000). There is no reversal to Schumpeter mark I but rather the emergence of a new 
type of entrepreneurship that relies on the importance of networks and collaborations (Powell, 
Koput and Smith doerr, 1996). 
 
Yet, if networks are the central drivers of innovation it does not mean that individual 
entrepreneurs play no role. They still need to develop specific competences, at least to ensure the 
creation of their network. In this sense, competences such as the ability to bridge different 
culture, open-mindedness, etc. may become central. Following Radosevic (2005), the 
entrepreneur must have the ability to set-up agreements among all interested parties (such as the 
inventor of the process, the partners, the capitalists, the suppliers, the distributors), to enlist 
cooperation of official agents, to put together adequate staff, etc. We have identified this 
competence (the ability to bridge different actors) in three interviews with founders. Only Firm C 
lacked it, which may provide the central explanation of its failure. This ability to bridge 
heterogeneous networks and persons may become far more important for entrepreneurs in biotech 
than scientific or managerial abilities. 
 
To summarise, far from following the traditional Schumpeter mark I or II framework, 
entrepreneurship in biotech is a distributed process since, as put by Minkes and Foxall (2003, pp. 
226): “The entrepreneurial spark will be found in more than one person and in more than one 
place”. The entrepreneurial function is in some sense distributed among a wide number of 
individuals and institutions
27. An important difference between this paper and former studies on 
                                                 
27 Minkes and Foxall (2003) emphasise the contribution of Herbert Simon to the notion of distributed 
entrepreneurship. They consider that the seminal work of Simon regarding bounded rationality, dispersed knowledge 
and satisfactory choices contributed to question the hypothesis of ‘the lonely captain on the bridge’ and opened the 
door to distributed entrepreneurship. 
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entrepreneurship as being distributed across individuals within a given firm, while we would like 
to suggest in this work that it is distributed between different institutions. The locus of 
entrepreneurship cannot be limited to a single institution. Our four cases emphasise this 
distributed dimension of entrepreneurship by putting forward the role of formal alliances, 
informal relationships and public institutions that surround and assist the entrepreneur. 
 
In biotechnology, beyond maintaining close relationships with public research and the scientific 
community, the importance of which were already emphasised in section 3.1, it is central for 
entrepreneurs to develop formal alliances with other players. Formal collaborations are necessary 
for small structure such as new biotech firms in order to access external knowledge, to outsource 
clinical trials or administrative tasks, to acquire specific inputs, to access the market, etc. Our 
interviews confirm that firms’ development rests strongly on their networks of partners, such as 
other biotech firms, academic labs, consulting companies, suppliers, financers, public institutions, 
etc. Firms that cannot rely on such networks can hardly expect to succeed, as illustrated by the 
example of Firm C. Answers to the questionnaire we addressed to firms of the Upper-Rhine 
Biovalley also stress the importance of formal collaborations
28.  
 
More generally, this need to contract alliances is observed in all the biotech industry. According 
to Hagedoorn (2002), the bio-pharmaceutical industry experiences since the end of the 1970s an 
extraordinary burst of technological inter-firm collaborations. In 1998, collaboration agreements 
contracted between biotechnologies and pharmaceutical companies represented approximately 
30% of the total of the collaborations in all industries. This is in line with the analysis of 
McKelvey, who stresses that: “The small biotech start-up firms do not replace the pharmaceutical 
firms. They instead play a vital role as the link between on-going university science and 
pharmaceutical firms, where each actor has specialised knowledge and institutions relevant for 
producing specific kinds of knowledge relevant to innovations” (McKelvey, 1998, p. 166). 
 
Yet, most usual partners of biotech start-ups in the Upper-Rhine Biovalley are public research 
organisations (which is acknowledged by most of the firms as the most central partner) and other 
small new biotech firms. Firms of the Upper Rhine Biovalley collaborate rarely with big-
pharmaceutical firms. This comes out both from our interviews (none of our four firms 
collaborate with big-pharmaceutical companies) and from answers to the questionnaire. 
 
This lack of collaboration with big-pharmaceutical companies is rather surprising since usually 
the latter are fully part of the story in entrepreneurship in biotech as indicated by statistics of 
collaborations above. Yet, it is likely to come from a discrepancy between research programs 
undertaken by new biotech firms and big pharmaceutical companies, which are positioned closer 
to the market and will agree to develop collaborations only with start-ups that have research close 
enough to the market. Since the Upper-Rhine Biovalley corresponds more to an emerging 
network and none firms of its is in such an advanced position, it is of few interest to big-
                                                 
28 Almost all the 18 firms that answered our questionnaire are involved in formal collaborations with other 
organizations. Only two firms out of the 18 report that they were not engaged in any R&D partnership within the last 
three years. Furthermore, firms are not involved in only a single collaboration but for most of them develop a web of 
partners. 
  20pharmaceutical companies to collaborate with them. Conversely, in the US biotech firms may be 
closer to the market and therefore may be of more interest to big-pharmaceutical companies. 
 
Formal collaborations are central but this does not mean that informal relationships among 
individuals are not. On the contrary, our interviews emphasise strongly the importance of 
informal contacts during the process of creating a new biotech venture. In the four cases informal 
contacts were central to explain the birth of the new venture. In the case of Firm B, for instance, 
it is the links and even the friendship among two of the cofounders that led to the new firm. 
Similarly, for Firm A it is a personal contact that enabled the founder to find his CSO. In the case 
of Firm D it is also informal contacts that led to the meeting of the two founders. Finally, the 
failure of Firm C can be explained by the lack of know-who of the founder, who was not 
endowed with a sufficient reputation, managerial as well as scientific, to attract partners. 
 
Informal contacts are central first in order to get financing. Our interviews all indicate that 
beyond the scientific quality of the project or its feasibility, personal contacts with financers are 
necessary to attract funds. Second, informal links are useful to find collaborators willing to enter 
the project, i.e. they allow the founder to set up the team and to hire competent collaborators. It 
comes out of all cases that the composition of the double heading of the company (CSO and 
CEO) that is absolutely standard in biotech
29 was always operated through informal links. People 
meet each other and develop their informal network during conferences and professional 
meetings. Biotech in France is a small world where it is very difficult for outsiders to find 
collaborators. 
 
More generally, it seems that informal contacts among scientists, industrials and financers are 
very important to ensure the coherence and the assemblage of complementary competences. 
Gittelman and Kogut (2003) have indeed showed with US data that the logic that drives science 
and industrial innovation are likely to be diverging. In order to overcome those conflicting logics 
go between actors, who are persons both entitled with a reputation as scientists and industrials 
and who have therefore developed an important informal network, are essentials. We find here an 
important justification for star scientists, who usually do not play an active role in a company, but 
essentially give an access to their know-who. 
 
A last feature related to the collective nature of entrepreneurship in biotech is the important role 
played by public institutions, either to fund new projects at an early stage or to provide assistance 
and networking. Our four interviews acknowledge the importance of the incubator during the first 
stage of the project. It usually facilitates the creation of new ventures by hosting the company 
within its own building during the first years of the project, which helped resolving the problem 
of finding a place and of buying costly scientific equipments. First, it removes most of the 
financial burden and, second, it allows the entrepreneur to focus on the core of the project and not 
on peripheral details. Furthermore, incubators usually also provide assistance to the new venture. 
They help the founder to establish a business-plan, to build a relevant intellectual property right 
                                                 
29 We already mentioned that biotech start-up almost all adopt a standard organisation composed of two heads: One 
chief scientific officer (CSO), in charge of scientific aspects, and one chief executive officer (CEO), in charge of 
managerial and business aspects. This standard organisation is essential in order to obtain financing. It came out of 
all our interviews that, although financers value highly patents and the credibility of the scientific project, they hardly 
agree to finance start-ups that do not have an experienced business officer (Powell et al., 2002 ; Prevezer, 2001). 
  21policy, and most of all they play a very important role as go between institution: they give more 
visibility and credibility to the project and they help the entrepreneur to find relevant partners and 
collaborators. 
 
Other public institutions also play a role during the first year of a new company. Public 
institutions such as ANVAR in France can, for instance, distribute grants that, although modest, 
help to activate the project during its initial phase. Standard financial institutions indeed hardly 
agree to provide funds when the project is at an early phase, which means that entrepreneurs must 
use other sources of financing such as their own funds or the help of business angels. In this sense 
public institutions that provide money at an early stage are often necessary to launch projects that 
otherwise could never take off. Those institutions usually also do more than merely funding early 
projects. They send a signal of quality towards other actors of innovation. By helping the project 
they indicate that it may be feasible and promising. 
 
To conclude this section, we discussed here the emergence of a distributed form of 
entrepreneurship in biotech. New biotech start-ups, although they rely heavily on the personality 
of their founder(s), are most of the time the outcome of a distributed process that involves many 
actors who need to develop tight interactions. They are not the fact of isolated individuals or 
organisations. An interesting issue is whether this feature is due to the emerging nature of the 
industry in France, which exacerbates the needs for collaboration and coordination (Cohendet et 
al., 2006), or to the intrinsic nature of the sector. Comparison among the European case and the 
US, where the industry is much more mature, could bring an answer to this question. First results 
indicate that clustering and R&D collaboration are also central feature of biotech in the US. 
Aharonson et al. (2004), for instance, examine how industrial clustering affects biotechnology 
firms’ innovativeness. They find that clustered firms are eight times more innovative than 






This paper aimed at understanding the main features of entrepreneurship in biotech through a 
detailed analysis of the foundation of four start-ups located on the French side of the Upper-
Rhine Biovalley. Our objective was to go into the black box in order to analyse the genesis of 
new biotech ventures. Hypotheses raised here should hence provide a good starting point for 
more quantitative research that will confirm or invalidate them. 
 
The four firms we studied were founded between 1999 and 2001, developed different strategies 
and experienced divergent trajectories. One firm has never really been able to take off and went 
bankrupt two years after its foundation. Another firm raised many hopes, experienced a rapid 
growth and finally went bankrupt six years after it was erected. The third one also experienced a 
quick growth but is still alive at the present time, although its future is uncertain. Finally the 
fourth one adopted a less ambitious strategy based on short run cash-flows but it also seems to be 
more stable than the others. 
 
Our analysis enabled us to stress several characteristics of entrepreneurship in biotech. A first 
insight deals with the motivations that drive the founders, at least when they come from the 
  22academia. We have seen that those motivations are usually not directly based on money but on 
more complex mechanisms. Scientists may, for instance, want to foster the industrial exploitation 
of their research in order to make them benefit general public. Or they may want to increase 
research budget and achieve more freedom for their research. More generally, scientists may 
want to join industry because it often offers more opportunities than the public sector. Yet, we 
have also seen that this willingness to create a venture in order to pursue his research also entails 
risks. Projects that are too far from the market usually do not survive very long. 
 
Beyond the motivations of the founders, we emphasised three broad points that appear as central 
within the entrepreneurship process: The role of public science, the role of patents and the 
collective dimension of start-ups’ creation. First, biotech entrepreneurship in France cannot be 
understood without public science. Most new biotech firms are founded by public scientists and 
almost all biotech start-ups acknowledge strong links with at least one public lab. Second, for 
biotech firms involved in drug production, patents are highly necessary. New ventures cannot 
exist without a strong patent system. Third, the process of entrepreneurship in biotech is a 
distributed process in the sense that it does not rely on one single entrepreneur but on the 
assemblage of a mix of competences distributed over a wide range of individuals and 
organisations. 
 
To conclude, we believe that a promising approach of entrepreneurship in biotech deals with the 
notion of distributed entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship in biotech is never the fact of one single 
player, neither is it the fact of several firms that just share knowledge or other items. Rather, 
entrepreneurship arises in a collective network of heterogeneous actors, each of them acting on a 
fraction of the system but being inseparable from the other members, implying that the whole is 
worth more than the sum of each of its parts. Following McKelvey (1998, p. 168): 
“Entrepreneurship in modern economy is different because entrepreneurs can be distributed 
among a system of innovation rather than concentrated in one type of firm”. In this sense, 
although there may be a leader who orients the project, each actor plays a role and it may be very 
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